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I. INTRODUCTION 
Many people find themselves following a strict daily routine 
that can be severely disrupted if they miss something as minor as 
their morning coffee.  For such people, jury duty presents a major 
challenge.  The court system disrupts many Americans’ routines 
across the nation on a daily basis, forcing them to miss work, find 
alternate daycare, and make alternate plans to transport children 
to after-school activities.  The trial itself presents unusual tasks that 
few people undertake on a daily basis, such as remembering large 
amounts of testimony from experts in an unfamiliar field.  To 
illustrate, consider the case of Linda Johnson.  After dropping off 
her children at school, Linda would normally head straight to the 
office for an eight-hour day of work, but instead she must go to the 
courthouse because she has been summoned for jury duty.  After 
the voir dire process, she is selected to sit on the jury, and she 
happily complies to fulfill her civic duty.  She listens carefully to the 
opening statements and the witnesses’ testimonies, but she begins 
to feel uncomfortable as the expert witness discusses an unfamiliar 
topic.  Linda becomes stressed as the witness is being cross-
examined because she is having trouble understanding what the 
expert is saying.  A simple definition is all she needs, but she has no 
opportunity to ask.  Linda’s experience is an example of stress that 
jurors can feel because they are not allowed to ask questions during 
trial.  This article discusses the controversy surrounding the 
practice of allowing jurors to ask such questions. 
Jury duty is an experience that a majority of Americans face at 
least once in their lifetime.1  Most do not find jury service to be a 
burden,2 despite the popular notion of “getting out of jury duty.”  
In fact, eighty-four percent of adults polled believe jury service is a 
civic duty to be fulfilled despite its possible inconvenience.3  
Furthermore, adults called for jury duty have a more positive 
attitude towards the experience than those who have never been 
called.4  Despite these positive statistics, jurors often experience a 
variety of stressful events as a result of jury duty.5 
 
 1. AM. BAR ASS’N, JURY SERVICE: IS FULFILLING YOUR CIVIC DUTY A TRIAL? 6 
(2004), http://www.abanews.org/releases/juryreport.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 5. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 6. 
 5. For a review, see Stanley M. Kaplan & Carolyn Winget, The Occupational 
Hazards of Jury Duty, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 325, 327-28 (1992) 
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In order to encourage jurors to fulfill the constitutional role 
set out by the Sixth Amendment, courts should provide the jurors 
with the best experience possible, including finding ways to limit 
juror stress.6  Thirty states7 have begun testing and implementing 
jury innovations to improve the jurors’ experiences and aid them in 
being better fact-finders.8  This article will focus on the 
controversial9 jury innovation of allowing jurors to ask questions to 
witnesses during trial.  Such a practice could have many benefits, 
including aiding in jurors’ comprehension of evidence and 
promoting overall satisfaction with the process.10  On the other 
hand, the practice could negatively impact the adversarial process 
in a variety of ways.11 
In Part II, this paper will discuss the psychological “Story 
Model” of juror decision-making.  This model theorizes that jurors 
actively participate in trial by constructing stories that help them 
understand complex evidence.12  This psychological research 
supports the need for jury innovations, especially the practice of 
allowing jurors to ask questions of witnesses.  Next, Part III will 
provide an overview of juror questioning and examine various 
reasons why judges hesitate to allow this innovation.  Then, Part IV 
will examine the benefits and criticisms that have been supported 
through empirical studies.  Part V follows with a discussion of 
apparent misconceptions among the supporters and critics, and 
Part VI will present court decisions that support and discourage the 
practice.  Part VII provides the recommendation that courts should 
uniformly adopt the practice of allowing jurors to ask questions.  
This article concludes that, because there are few adverse effects in 
 
(discussing the discomforting physical and physiological symptoms experienced by 
jurors); Monica K. Miller & Brian H. Bornstein, Juror Stress: Causes and Interventions, 
30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 237 (2004) (outlining various sources of juror stress). 
 6. See generally Miller & Bornstein, supra note 5. 
 7. Gregory E. Mize & Christopher J. Connelly, Jury Trial Innovations: Charting 
a Rising Tide, 41 CT. REV. 4, 5 (2004). 
 8. Id. 
 9. B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating 
Educated and Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1253 (1993) (listing ten techniques 
and procedures to enhance juror participation and comprehension); B. Michael 
Dann & Valerie P. Hans, Recent Evaluative Research on Jury Trial Innovations, 41 CT. 
REV. 12 (2004); Valerie P. Hans, U.S. Jury Reform: The Active Jury and the Adversarial 
Ideal, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 85, 90 (2002) (noting increasing support for a 
participatory approach to decision-making). 
 10. See infra Part IV.A. 
 11. See infra Part IV.B. 
 12. See infra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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allowing juror questioning, the practice should be implemented.  
This practice will increase jurors’ satisfaction with the jury 
experience and help jurors become better decision-makers. 
II. THE ACTIVE JURY CREATES A STORY 
In its idealistic form, the adversarial system requires the 
decision-maker to remain passive and neutral by waiting until after 
the closing arguments to make any decisions.13  This system differs 
from the inquisitorial system that is used in many European 
countries.14  The inquisitorial system is an alternative to the 
adversarial system that allows the decision-maker to play an active 
role in uncovering evidence, including the questioning of 
witnesses.15 
While jurors in the adversarial system cannot actively 
participate, legal rulings have concluded that judges are allowed to 
play an active role and question witnesses, both when the judge is 
the decision-maker and when a jury is the decision-maker.16  This 
apparent inequity poses the question: If the judge is allowed to play 
an active role and ask questions of witnesses, then should jurors be 
allowed to do the same when they are the decision-makers in the 
case?  The answer to this question differs depending on who is 
being asked, and has created quite a controversy.17 
For the purpose of this section, the issue will be viewed from a 
psychological standpoint.  A well-known psychological theory of 
decision-making, called the “Story Model,” explains that jurors 
rarely wait until the end of the trial to come to conclusions.18  
Instead, they are cognitively active throughout the trial.  Such 
research suggests that jurors should be allowed to ask questions in 
order to facilitate their natural decision-making tendencies. 
 
 13. Hans, supra note 9, at 87. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 88. 
 17. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R. Rose & Beth Murphy, Jurors’ 
Unanswered Questions, 41 CT. REV. 20 (2004). 
 18. See generally Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Juror Decision Making Models: 
The Generalization Gap, 89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 246 (1981) [hereinafter Pennington & 
Hastie, Juror Decision Making Models] (reviewing decision-making models that have 
been applied to jurors); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in 
Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242 (1986) 
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation] (discussing the role of 
representation of evidence in juror’s decision-making). 
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Psychologists Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie propose that 
jurors organize trial evidence into a narrative story based on 
intentions and causation of events.19  The Story Model suggests that 
jurors construct mental accounts of the trial to comprehend 
evidence.  This story allows the juror to better understand the 
evidence and reach a verdict decision.20  Through empirical studies, 
the authors discovered support for their model21 and its three 
components: construction of a story, establishing verdict categories, 
and classifying the story into the best fit verdict category.22 
In one study, participants were randomly selected from a 
Massachusetts jury pool to view a videotaped trial, and each was 
instructed to reach a decision as a juror.23  Participants were then 
interviewed to discuss their decision-making processes and their 
recall of verdict definitions.24  Interviews uncovered that 
participants did not organize evidence as a list, but instead 
organized evidence by arranging events into causes and effects, 
which facilitated the creation of a sensible story that best explains 
the evidence presented.  Jurors also surmised missing pieces, while 
disregarding information that did not fit their stories.25  Next, after 
hearing all of the evidence, participants constructed stories about 
the relevant verdict categories (e.g., first-degree murder, 
manslaughter).26  Simply put, jurors create a mental image of what 
each verdict category means to them.  Finally, jurors decide which 
verdict category is most suitable for the story they have created.  
This finding implies that jurors create and shape stories as a means 
to answer the legal questions bestowed upon them. 
Pennington and Hastie performed another series of 
experiments that further supported the Story Model.27  In these 
experiments, participants read shortened trial transcripts and were 
asked the direction and probability of their judgment about the 
 
 19. Pennington & Hastie, Juror Decision Making Models, supra note 18, at 252-
53; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 18, at 243. 
 20. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 18, at 243. 
 21. Id. at 242-43; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: 
Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
189 (1992) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence]. 
 22. Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 18, at 242. 
 23. Id. at 246. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 252. 
 26. Id. at 252-53. 
 27. Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 21, at 189. 
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case.28  Different versions of case facts were manipulated29 that 
would affect the ease of constructing a story.30  The research found 
that participants’ evaluations of evidence strength, witness 
credibility, and confidence judgments are all affected by the ease in 
which they can construct stories.31  This means that jurors make 
stronger,32 more confident decisions when the evidence is 
presented in the order of a story as opposed to the order that 
evidence is presented at trial.33  The authors conclude that a 
“narrative story sequence is the most effective ‘order of proof’ at 
trial.”34  While trial judges instruct jurors to refrain from making a 
judgment until all evidence has been presented, these studies 
suggest that jurors’ natural decision-making processes do not allow 
them to do so.35  This line of research also suggests that jurors often 
have “holes” in their stories, which could be filled by asking 
questions of witnesses.  Answers could help jurors create more 
accurate stories, leading to better judgments. 
In sum, the Story Model provides theoretical explanations of 
how jurors actively process information throughout trial.36  The 
Honorable B. Michael Dann, the judge responsible for the leading 
jury innovations in Arizona, acknowledges that jurors actively 
process information based on a similar Behavioral-Educational 
Model,37 even though they are instructed to make decisions in 
 
 28. Id. at 193-94 (Experiment 1), 197-98 (Experiment 2), 201 (Experiment 
3). 
 29. Ratings for the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt varied based on the 
various experimental conditions. 
 30. Pennington & Hastie, Explaining the Evidence, supra note 21, at 193-94 
(Experiment 1 manipulated order of presenting evidence and credibility of a 
witness), 197-98 (Experiment 2 manipulated the completeness of the story to infer 
either guilt or innocence and the aggregation level for making judgments, in 
which participants were to assess evidence strength by making either a single 
“global” judgment after reading all the evidence, “item-by-item” judgments after 
each piece of evidence was presented on all the evidence given to that point, or 
“local” judgments on blocks of evidence considered separately), 201 (Experiment 
3 manipulated aggregation level on a new case, using only “global” and “item-by-
item” judgments). 
 31. Id. at 194-96, 202. 
 32. The jurors’ decisions are stronger in the preponderance of the evidence 
direction.  Id. at 202. 
 33. Id. at 194-95. 
 34. Id. at 203. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See generally Pennington & Hastie, Juror Decision Making Models, supra note 
18; Pennington & Hastie, Evidence Evaluation, supra note 18; Pennington & Hastie, 
Explaining the Evidence, supra note 21, at 189. 
 37. The Behavioral-Educational Model is based on systematic research 
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accordance with the adversarial Legal Model.38  Judge Dann 
advocates the use of educational techniques39 to assist jurors in 
making fair and accurate decisions.40  Allowing jurors to ask 
questions of witnesses is just one of the many jury innovations that 
Judge Dann recommends and has implemented in his Arizona 
courtroom.41 
Other states are recognizing that jurors are actively 
participating, and that allowing them to ask questions is 
important.42  Some court decisions43 and jury innovation 
committees44 are recommending the practice due to the realized 
benefits.  Thus, this line of psychological research has found its way 
into courtrooms across the country. 
III. JUROR QUESTIONING: WHY ALL THE CONTROVERSY? 
The surge of jury innovation research has convinced many 
federal and state courts,45 as well as the American Bar Association 
(ABA), to allow jurors to ask questions of witnesses.46  The ABA has 
developed standards for juror questioning which include 
cautionary instructions and procedures47 and added commentary 
 
findings, including the “Story Model,” as well as other psychological and 
educational studies.  For an overview of the research contributing to this model, 
see Dann, supra note 9, at 1241-46. 
 38. The Legal Model is the longstanding model used by the courts, which is 
based on the ideal expectations of the adversarial system and assumes that jurors 
are passive.  For a description of the Legal Model, see id.  at 1239-40.  For a 
comparative summary of the Legal Model and the Behavioral-Educational Model, 
see id. at 1246. 
 39. The main technique is interaction (to “evoke questions, focus attention, 
motivate students, assist recall, and allow students to benefit from the exposure to 
others’ views”), specifically student-initiated interaction (to provide and elicit 
information, as well as provide teachers with direction).  Id. at 1245.  The other 
technique used by educators is the “democratic classroom,” which balances 
control and students’ “speaking rights.”  Id. at 1245-46.  For a deeper look into 
these educational techniques, see id. at 1244-46. 
 40. Id. at 1230, 1246. 
 41. Id. at 1253-55. 
 42. See infra Part VI.A. 
 43. See infra notes 227-32. 
 44. See infra notes 241-43. 
 45. See infra Part VI.A.  For a list of states’ rules on juror questioning, see 
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JURISDICTION-BY-JURISDICTION RULES FOR JUROR 
QUESTIONS TO WITNESSES (2004), http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_improvements_ 
questions_laws.asp. 
 46. AM. BAR ASS’N, CIVIL TRIAL PRACTICE STANDARD PART ONE: THE JURY, 
STANDARD 4 at 6, 8 (1998). 
 47. Id. at 6-7. 
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about the practice.48  The ABA Standards indicate that juror 
questioning may be neither necessary nor appropriate in many 
cases, but the opportunity should be available if the need does 
arise.49  Although the role of questioning of witnesses is reserved for 
the attorneys, juror questioning may provide clarification of 
complicated or unclear testimony during the juror’s quest for 
truth.50 
If juror questioning is going to be permitted, the trial judge 
reads the instructions to the jury regarding the practice.  The ABA 
Standards indicate that the purpose of questioning is only to clarify 
testimony, thus jurors cannot express opinions through the 
questions or argue with witnesses.  Additionally, jurors are 
reminded that their role is one of a neutral fact finder, not an 
advocate for either party to the case.51  Jurors are also instructed 
that their own questions are not to be given more weight than 
other evidence in the case.52  Furthermore, the judge informs the 
jury that some questions may not be answered due to legal reasons, 
such as the rules of evidence, or because the question will probably 
be answered later in the case.53  The judge instructs the jury that no 
inference is to be drawn if a question is not asked, and that it is not 
a reflection on the juror or the question.54 
A. Positive Opinions of Juror Questioning 
Many judges55 and attorneys56 favor the practice of allowing 
jurors to ask questions of witnesses.  The Committee on Juries of 
the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit looked at twenty-six 
 
 48. Id. at 8-10. 
 49. Id. at 8. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 6. 
 52. Id. at 7. 
 53. Id. at 6-7. 
 54. Id. at 7. 
 55. Leonard B. Sand & Steven A. Reiss, A Report on Seven Experiments Conducted 
by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 446 (1985).  See 
generally Colin F. Campbell & Bob James, Innovations in Jury Management from a 
Trial Court’s Perspective, 43 NO. 4 JUDGE’S J. 22, 26 (2004); John R. Stegner, Why I Let 
Jurors Ask Questions in Criminal Trials, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 541 (2004); John P. Wesley, 
Jury Trial Innovations: Daring to Improve What We Are Sworn to Reserve, 30 VT. BAR J. & 
L. DIG. 17 (2004). 
 56. J. Donald Cowan, Jr., Thomas M. Crisham, Michael B. Keating, Gael 
Mahony, Debra E. Pole, Michael A. Pope, William W. Schwarzer & John R. Wester, 
What Attorneys Think of Jury Trial Innovations, 86 JUDICATURE 192, 194 (2003). 
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trials, involving New York and Vermont federal district courts.57  
Four of the six judges who participated found the procedure to be 
beneficial, particularly in keeping the jury focused on important 
issues and helping the jury stay alert by allowing them to feel more 
involved in the proceedings.58  Another study of judges’ attitudes 
toward jury innovations also found general support for juror 
questioning.59  Sixty percent of the Washington judges surveyed 
believed that permitting jurors to ask questions would improve the 
jury system.60 
Additionally, Judge John R. Stegner argues that finding the 
truth is the main purpose of the trial61 and that this goal is 
weakened when attorneys hold back and twist evidence.62  
Therefore, jurors should be allowed to ask questions to sort out or 
clarify complex and ambiguous evidence.63  Since judges are given 
this opportunity, jurors should also have the same privilege.64 
Speaking anecdotally from his experiences, Judge Stegner has 
never seen an instance where a juror’s question sought to 
investigate a new aspect of the crime that was not already 
established by the attorneys.65  He also reports that juror 
questioning alerts attorneys to issues that must be developed 
further.66  In addition, jurors are appreciative of being allowed to 
ask questions.67  Judge Stegner also acknowledges that juror 
questioning extends the trial length,68 which is a major concern of 
the critics.69  Nevertheless, he still allows the practice and goes so 
far as to reject objections on the grounds of “needless consumption 
of time.”70  When a juror asks a question that has already been 
addressed or that extends past the range of the earlier questioning, 
the attorneys have a legitimate objection based on time 
 
 57. Sand & Reiss, supra note 55, at 443. 
 58. Id. at 446. 
 59. David C. Brody & John Neiswender, Judicial Attitudes towards Jury Reform, 
83 JUDICATURE 298, 299 (2000). 
 60. Id. at 301. 
 61. Stegner, supra note 55, at 545-46. 
 62. Id. at 546. 
 63. Id. at 546-47. 
 64. Id. at 547. 
 65. Id. at 545. 
 66. Id. at 549. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 550. 
 69. See N. Randy Smith, Why I Do Not Let Jurors Ask Questions in Trials, 40 IDAHO 
L. REV. 553, 568 (2004). 
 70. Stegner, supra note 55, at 550. 
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consumption.71  However, Judge Stegner does not view answering 
the question again as an unnecessary waste of time because he finds 
it more important to be sure that the juror hears and understands 
the evidence.72  He believes that more questions result in a better 
outcome because jurors have more information and can analyze it 
more thoroughly.73 
A poll conducted by the American College of Trial Lawyers 
found a general support for juror questioning among attorneys as 
well.74  Seventy-nine percent of the attorneys polled believe that 
allowing jurors to ask questions improves juror comprehension of 
the evidence.75  Additionally, ninety-three percent of the attorneys 
believe that the practice increases juror satisfaction with the trial.76  
About one-half of respondents also view the practice as enhancing 
the quality of justice.77 
B. Negative Opinions of Juror Questioning 
Although there has been much approval for allowing jurors to 
ask questions, not all attorneys78 and judges79 support the practice.  
One of the primary reasons appears to be the possible threat to the 
principles underlying the adversary system.80  The adversary system 
calls for a neutral jury that remains an unbiased and objective fact-
finder.81  By allowing jurors to perform a role not intended for 
them under the adversary system, critics believe that the juror’s role 
becomes radically different.82  This leaves open the question of 
what the juror’s role currently is and what it should be. 
 
 71. Id. at 550-51. 
 72. Id. at 551. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Cowan et al., supra note 56, at 194. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See generally Smith, supra note 69. 
 80. See Robert Augustus Harper & Michael Robert Ufferman, Jury Questions in 
Criminal Cases: Neutral Arbiters or Active Interrogators?, 78 FLA. B.J. 8, 13 (2004); 
Nicole L. Mott, The Current Debate on Juror Questions: “To Ask or Not to Ask, That Is the 
Question,” 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1099, 1099 (2003); Smith, supra note 69, at 563-64. 
 81. Smith, supra note 69, at 562; Harper & Ufferman, supra note 80, at 13. 
 82. See Smith, supra note 69, at 563-64. 
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1. Judges’ Concerns 
Judge Dann believes that there are many reasons for the 
controversy over juror questioning.83  One major concern is that 
allowing jurors to question witnesses significantly alters the roles of 
attorneys and the judge.84  In particular, allowing juries to 
participate in the trial threatens the advocates’ control of their case 
and the judge’s control of the trial.85 
Another primary criticism is that jurors’ questions will help 
prosecutors and plaintiffs meet their required burden of proof by 
bringing out evidence that will strengthen one party’s arguments.86  
For example, jurors may ask questions that indicate that there are 
holes in the prosecutor’s story, giving the prosecutor a second 
chance to prove the case.  This could be seen as an unfair 
advantage for the prosecutor.  If this happens, it compromises the 
legal system’s premise that if a party cannot meet the burden of 
proof, then that party should not win the case.87  In such an 
instance, the prosecutor is given an unfair advantage.  Because the 
goal of finding the truth must not trump the defendant’s 
constitutional right of a fair trial by jury,88 some critics suggest that 
jury questioning is too risky. 
Additionally, despite the Second Circuit’s generally positive 
findings for juror questioning,89 two judges in the study said they 
did not intend to permit the practice in the future.90  One of these 
two judges found the questioning to be disruptive and believed that 
counsel should be the only ones allowed to question witnesses.91  
This judge said that if jurors need crucial information, then they 
will ask the court for it, without needing special procedures to ask 
questions.92  The other judge expressed his belief that if jurors ask 
questions, then they probably have preconceptions that are not 
likely to be changed.93  While voir dire is intended to act as a 
safeguard to prevent jurors with such inflexible preconceptions 
 
 83. Dann, supra note 9, at 1253. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Smith, supra note 69, at 567. 
 87. Id. at 560. 
 88. Id. at 567; see also Harper & Ufferman, supra note 80, at 13. 
 89. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. 
 90. Sand & Reiss, supra note 55, at 444. 
 91. Id. at 445. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 444. 
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from sitting on the jury, typical voir dire is seldom effective in 
detecting this bias.94  Thus, biased jurors do manage to find their 
way on the jury.  These jurors could, as the judge notes, use 
questioning as a technique to further his or her own agenda.95  
However, this judge’s concerns are not supported by research, 
which has revealed that questions asked by the jurors appear to 
focus more on clarifying evidence rather than choosing a side and 
interrogating witnesses.96 
G. Thomas Munsterman, a leading researcher in jury 
innovations, suggests an alternative explanation for the debate over 
juror questioning.97  He argues that judges are more hesitant to 
allow this jury innovation as compared to most other innovations 
because of the continued vigilance of the judge that is required 
over this ongoing process.98  Unlike other jury innovations, juror 
questioning is one of the few that requires attention throughout 
the entire practice.99  For example, jury note-taking only requires 
one decision: whether or not to allow the practice.100  However, 
juror questioning involves numerous procedures and the judge 
needs to make many more decisions in addition to the initial 
decision to allow the practice.101  Therefore, the practice lengthens 
the trial,102 which some argue is “a needless consumption of 
time.”103  Another potential concern may be that making numerous 
decisions about the practice allows for many more chances for 
appeals because every one of these decisions is under scrutiny. 
Munsterman proposes that many judges feel uncomfortable 
making decisions about whether to allow a question.104  The judges 
face a greater complexity with this innovation as compared to 
 
 94. Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? 
Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1179, 
1182 (2003). 
 95. Sand & Reiss, supra note 55, at 444. 
 96. Mott, supra note 80, at 1119. 
 97. Interview with G. Thomas Munsterman, Dir. of the Ctr. for Jury Studies, 
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts (Dec. 7, 2004). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 46, at 5. 
 101. Id. at 6-7. 
 102. Stegner, supra note 55, at 551. 
 103. Smith, supra note 69, at 568.  This comment is based on Rule 611(a) of 
the Idaho Rules of Evidence, which states that courts must “avoid needless 
consumption of time.”  IDAHO R. EVID. 611(a). 
 104. Interview with G. Thomas Munsterman, Dir. of the Ctr. for Jury Studies, 
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts (Dec. 7, 2004). 
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others because of the potential ramifications (e.g., jurors drawing 
inferences from unasked questions).105  Different judges have 
varying thresholds for admittance standards, in which some follow 
the most lenient standard possible, while others employ a stricter 
standard.106  Judges who use the lenient standard simply ask the 
attorneys if they accept the question, and if neither attorney 
objects, then the judge will ask the question.107  Juror questioning 
gives the judge a greater challenge than any other innovation, but 
the solution to the challenge may come with more training, 
particularly over the threshold for admitting questions.108  In 
addition, after a determination is made that a question can be 
asked, a new decision must be made of whether an attorney or the 
judge asks the question.109  With a lack of training on how to handle 
juror questioning, it is no surprise that many judges are skeptical of 
allowing the practice. 
2. Attorneys’ Concerns 
While the American College of Trial Lawyers poll uncovered 
that attorneys generally support juror questioning,110 many 
attorneys are still skeptical of the practice.111  Some attorneys fear 
jurors will abuse the opportunity by becoming competitive against 
attorneys or other jurors, or that jurors may ask questions simply 
because they can.112  In addition, one-third of the attorneys feel that 
the practice diminishes the quality of justice.113 
Another criticism of juror questioning is that it gives the 
prosecutor a “second chance to make his case” to the jurors.114  If 
jurors see a gap in the prosecution’s theory, they may ask for 
further clarification, and then the prosecutor can fill in the gap.115  
Therefore, attorneys116 have the same fear as judges117 about jurors 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id.; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 46, at 7. 
 110. Cowan et al., supra note 56, at 194. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Richard Willing, Courts Try to Make Jury Duty Less of a Chore, USA TODAY, 
Mar. 17, 2005, at 17A. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Harper & Ufferman, supra note 80, at 13. 
 117. Smith, supra note 69, at 567; see also text accompanying notes 86-88. 
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helping meet the burden of proof.  Additionally, critics believe that 
defense attorneys would need to abandon their role of fervently 
representing the defendant by asking jurors’ questions that may be 
unfavorable to their side.118 
In sum, some judges and attorneys fear the consequences of 
allowing jurors to question witnesses.  The main concerns stem 
from the potential threat to the adversarial system, in which jurors’ 
roles may be transformed from neutral fact-finders to biased 
advocates.  Furthermore, the defendant’s constitutional rights may 
be infringed upon if the prosecution is given another chance to 
meet the burden of proof.  Also, judges and attorneys may feel that 
they lose control over the case.  Other concerns include the 
additional trial time necessary in implementing the practice and 
the lack of knowledge on the part of judges in making decisions 
about the admissibility of certain questions. 
IV. THE VERDICT IS IN: BENEFITS AND CRITICISMS THAT HOLD UP IN 
EMPIRICAL COURT 
A. The Benefits 
Psychological research has demonstrated many benefits of 
allowing jurors to ask questions to witnesses, such as assisting with 
comprehension of evidence and reducing stress of trial.119  For 
instance, Larry Heuer and Steven Penrod conducted two studies on 
trial complexity and how jury reforms would help jurors better 
comprehend the evidence and the law.120  Their national study 
 
 118. Harper & Ufferman, supra note 80, at 12. 
 119. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of 
Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29 (1994) [hereinafter Heuer & 
Penrod, Trial Complexity]; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Juror 
Participation in Trials Through Note Taking and Question Asking, 79 JUDICATURE 256 
(1996) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation]; Larry Heuer & 
Steven Penrod, Jury Decision-Making in Complex Trials, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN 
LEGAL CONTEXTS (D. Carson & R. Bull eds., 1995) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, 
Complex Trials]; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in 
Trials: A Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 231 (1988) [hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A 
Field Experiment]; Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking 
During Trials: A National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1994) 
[hereinafter Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials]. 
 120. See Heuer & Penrod, Trial Complexity, supra note 119; Heuer & Penrod, 
Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Complex Trials, supra 
note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
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consisted of 160 state and federal trials in thirty-three states,121 
seventy-five of which were civil cases and eighty-five were criminal 
cases.122  Their other study consisted of sixty-seven Wisconsin state 
trials, thirty-four of which were civil cases and thirty-three were 
criminal cases.123  The authors drew many conclusions that respond 
to advocates’ claims of advantages and critics’ claims of 
disadvantages.124 
The authors conclude that juror questioning is beneficial in 
that it advances juror understanding of the case issues and facts.125  
In addition, the process reduces juror doubts about evidence 
presented at trial.126  The jurors allowed to ask questions in the 
Wisconsin study were more satisfied with the questioning of the 
witness, and more often said there was sufficient information to 
reach a reliable verdict.127  In the national study, juror questions 
were the most helpful when evidence and legal information were 
most complex.128  As evidence became more complex, jurors in the 
non-questioning condition were less confident that they reached 
the right verdict, as compared to those in the question-asking 
condition.129  The authors determined that jurors asked questions 
primarily to help clarify complicated testimony or legal issues.130  
 
note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra 
note 119. 
 121. Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra 
note 119, at 122; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 
256-57. 
 122. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 258; 
Heuer & Penrod, Trial complexity, supra note 119, at 29; Heuer & Penrod, Complex 
Trials, supra note 119, at 534. 
 123. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 258; 
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119, 
at 231. 
 124. See Heuer & Penrod, Trial Complexity, supra note 119; Heuer & Penrod, 
Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Complex Trials, supra 
note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra 
note 119. 
 125. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 142; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119, at 252. 
 126. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260. 
 127. Id.; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, 
supra note 119, at 252. 
 128. Heuer & Penrod, Complex Trials, supra note 119, at 537. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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Allowing jurors to question witnesses also reduced the harms (e.g., 
weaker verdict confidence, and finding the defense attorney less 
helpful)131 that often result when attorneys present complex 
information.132 
Judge Dann and psychologist Valerie P. Hans conducted an 
experiment using a mock jury to study questions jurors would ask 
to a DNA expert witness testifying on technical data.133  Their 
research uncovered extremely high support (97%) for juror 
questioning in the conditions that allowed the practice.134  In 
addition, 75% of mock jurors in the question-asking conditions said 
that the practice aided them in better comprehending the 
evidence.135  However, testing of comprehension levels found no 
statistical differences,136 indicating that the practice increased 
subjective perceptions of understanding but did not increase actual 
understanding of the evidence. 
Furthermore, jurors often expressed their desire to ask 
questions when they were unable to do so at trial.137  A Philadelphia 
study showed that 80% of jurors wanted to question witnesses, and 
49.5% said that at the end of the case, they still had questions that 
they wanted answered.138  Another study involving post-trial 
interviews revealed that jurors remained confused as they entered 
the jury box, and one juror wondered why she was not allowed to 
ask questions.139  “[Y]ou mean we just have to decide and can’t ask 
any more questions? . . . [W]hy do you leave us floundering here, 
why don’t you let us ask some questions and give us some 
answers?”140 
Research by Monica K. Miller and Brian H. Bornstein provides 
support for the use of jury questioning during trials as a means of 
reducing juror stress.141  When asked to identify stressors involved 
 
 131. Id. at 536. 
 132. Id. at 537. 
 133. Dann & Hans, supra note 9, at 15. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Nicole L. Mott, Valerie P. Hans & Lindsay Simpson, What’s Half a Lung 
Worth? Civil Jurors’ Accounts of Their Award Decision Making, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
401, 417 (2000); Douglas G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: 
Comparative Analysis and Proposals for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 556 (1997). 
 138. Smith, supra note 137, at 556. 
 139. Mott et al., supra note 137, at 417. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See generally Miller & Bornstein, supra note 5 (summarizing research on 
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in jury service, 21% of respondents reported at least a moderate 
stress level (i.e., a 3 or higher on a scale of 1-5) produced by the 
prohibition of asking questions and taking notes.142  This study also 
revealed that 40% of jurors experienced at least a moderate level of 
stress due to “having limited input during trial; not being allowed 
to ask questions.”143  While only 6% of jurors in the study were 
permitted to ask questions, 70% said the practice helped them at 
least moderately in performing their duties.144  On the other hand, 
65% of jurors who were not permitted to ask questions said the 
practice would have at least moderately helped them.145 
The National Center for State Courts has suggested that jurors 
experience stress when they are unable to actively participate in the 
trial.146  If jurors are allowed to ask questions at trial, then they will 
feel more control over the proceedings,147 which will increase 
concentration and make information processing easier.148  
Furthermore, a bailiff expressed his empathy for jurors not being 
allowed to ask questions.149  “I tell new bailiffs to think how it would 
feel if you had to sit there and couldn’t ask questions.  You have to 
just sit there listening to other people talk.”150 
Finally, a Colorado pilot program for testing juror questioning 
in the courts found evidence strongly in favor of allowing the 
innovation.151  Specifically, surveys of jurors found that 93% believe 
the practice should be permitted.152  Furthermore, jurors show 
more positive attitudes towards the trial proceedings when they are 
allowed to utilize the practice.153  Jurors felt they gained more 
information and clarification, as well as appearing more attentive 
 
juror stress and the measures available to help alleviate it). 
 142. Id.; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THROUGH THE EYES OF THE 
JUROR: A MANUAL FOR ADDRESSING JUROR STRESS 29 (1998), 
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_JurorStressPub.pdf. 
 143. Miller & Bornstein, supra note 5. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 142, at 29. 
 147. Id. at 3. 
 148. Id. at 29. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See MARY DODGE, SHOULD JURORS ASK QUESTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES? A 
REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT’S JURY SYSTEM COMMITTEE 
(2002), http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/committees/juryreformdocs/ 
dodgereport.pdf. 
 152. Id. at 47. 
 153. Id. at 57. 
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and engaged in the trial.154  In addition, judges and attorneys who 
experienced the innovation became increasingly supportive of the 
procedure.155 
B. The Criticisms 
Research has revealed very little data to support the criticisms 
of allowing jurors to ask questions.  Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary 
R. Rose, and Beth Murphy were given the unique opportunity to 
perform a detailed content analysis on jurors’ discussions both 
during deliberations and any conversations that occurred in the 
jury room.156  These interactions were videotaped as part of the 
Arizona Filming Project,157 in which fifty civil trials were sampled in 
the experiment.158  Jurors asked 820 questions throughout these 
trials, and over three-quarters (76%) of the questions were allowed 
by the judges.159  Overall, the findings of this study support the 
practice of jurors questioning witnesses,160 particularly because most 
of the questions refused by the judge resulted in no reaction from 
the jurors.161  However, some questions did cause some 
conversations that critics would deem harmful.162  Seven questions 
(4%) ignited some mild complaints over the judge’s refusal to ask 
the question, such as expressing shock or arguing that the question 
was relevant.163  In addition, there were thirty-one questions (16%) 
that the jurors tried to answer themselves after the judge refused to 
ask the question, implying that the question was inappropriate or 
irrelevant and should not be used in evaluating the case.164  The 
jurors drew inferences from direct testimony when attempting to 
answer twelve of those questions.165  The other questions were 
answered using the jurors’ own experiences, beliefs, and 
expertise.166  However, these questions were discussed as jurors 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 17, at 21-22. 
 157. Id. at 21. 
 158. Id. at 22. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 27. 
 161. Id. at 25. 
 162. Id. at 26. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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would normally talk about the issues if a question was not posed on 
the topic.167 
This study also found only one instance where a juror drew 
conclusions from the sole fact that the judge refused to answer the 
question.168  In this instance, the juror was interested in knowing if 
the plaintiff’s car had a specific design feature, and inferred from 
the judge’s failure to answer the question, “I got no answer, so 
evidently it’s not [part of the design].”169  However, a brief 
explanation as to why the question will not be asked serves as a 
simple safeguard that can be implemented to actually prevent such 
assumptions.170  The study found that no such inferences were 
drawn in any case when the judge gave even a small 
acknowledgment as to why the question was not asked.171  If the 
judge in this case would have mentioned that the question could 
not be answered simply because it is not relevant in making a 
decision, then the juror may not have drawn the conclusion that he 
did.  Therefore, only one question out of 820 caused a major 
problem, which probably would not have resulted if the proper 
safeguards were in place.172 
In sum, empirical research has supported many benefits and 
few criticisms of allowing jurors to ask questions.  First, jurors were 
more satisfied with the questioning of witnesses when they had the 
ability to ask questions.  Second, jurors were more confident in 
their understanding of the evidence and felt the evidence was 
clarified and sufficient for reaching a reliable verdict.  Next, jurors 
wanted to ask questions and they became more attentive and 
engaged in the trial when they were given the opportunity.  
Furthermore, the practice reduced juror stress caused by the jury 
experience. 
Conversely, empirical studies also uncovered criticisms for 
allowing jurors to ask questions.  For instance, jurors sometimes 
mildly complained when their questions were not answered and 
occasionally attempted to answer the questions themselves. 
Although very rare, jurors also drew conclusions from an 
unanswered question. 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 28. 
 171. See id. at 27. 
 172. Id. at 26, 28 n.48. 
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V. COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS: BENEFITS AND CRITICISMS THAT 
REMAIN UNSUPPORTED 
A. Not-So-Beneficial Benefits 
While some benefits are explained above as being supported 
empirically, there are other benefits listed by supporters that were 
not confirmed by psychological research. 
Advocates for juror questioning claim that one benefit of the 
practice is that it would help jurors get to the truth.173  However, 
the research discussed earlier by Heuer and Penrod demonstrated 
that this benefit does not actually occur, just as judges and lawyers 
in both studies had expected.174 
Another suggested benefit of juror questions is that they alert 
attorneys to specific issues that need to be developed further.175  In 
both studies conducted by Heuer and Penrod, the judges and 
lawyers expected juror questions to be helpful in pinpointing juror 
confusion about the law or evidence,176 but they agreed after the 
trial that that benefit was not realized.177 
Juror questioning also did not increase juror, attorney, and 
judge satisfaction over the verdict.178  Jurors appeared to be satisfied 
with the trial procedure, no matter which condition they were in 
during the trial, and their opinions did not differ much between 
 
 173. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119, at 237; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During 
Trials, supra note 119, at 125. 
 174. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119, 
at 252-53; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra 
note 119, at 143. 
 175. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119, at 237; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During 
Trials, supra note 119, at 125. 
 176. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119, 
at 254. 
 177. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119, 
at 254; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra 
note 119, at 143. 
 178. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119, 
at 253; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra 
note 119, at 144. 
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their verdicts179 or their attitudes toward jury service.180  Both judges 
and lawyers were also reasonably satisfied, judges somewhat more 
than lawyers, finding little difference between the conditions.181 
B. Criticizing the Criticisms 
While some criticisms of juror questioning were uncovered 
through psychological studies, there were also many criticisms 
rejected by empirical research.  One of the main criticisms of juror 
questioning is its posed threat to the adversary system;182 however, 
this criticism did not stand up to empirical testing.183  Nicole Mott 
performed a content analysis on 2271 questions asked by jurors in 
real trials.184  She found that jurors’ questions pose no real threat to 
the adversary system, and instead the questions are used to advance 
their role as neutral decision-makers.185  Jurors’ questions were used 
to clarify testimony and they did not attempt to uncover new 
evidence or cross-examine witnesses.186  Mott concludes that if 
jurors are supposed to seek truth in the facts, they need to 
comprehend the facts so as to not make uninformed decisions or 
possibly hang the jury.187 
The Heuer and Penrod studies found similar results by 
examining whether jurors can remain neutral (i.e., not become 
advocates) when they are allowed to ask questions.188  This concern 
is indirectly addressed by the pattern of jury decisions, which 
indicated that the verdicts were not significantly affected by 
whether or not the juries were allowed to ask questions.189  The 
 
 179. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119, 
at 253; Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra 
note 119, at 144. 
 180. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Mott, supra note 80, at 1099. 
 183. Id. at 1119. 
 184. Id. at 1111. 
 185. Id. at 1119.  Some examples of questions given are: “Please clarify who is 
allowed to contact who[m] during the order of protection.”; “Did you see blood 
anywhere else other than the knife?”; “What type of door locks were on the entry 
door? And how old is the door and lock?”  Id. at 1117. 
 186. Id. at 1119. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 146. 
 189. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
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practice did not affect judge-jury agreement rates190 and did not 
give the jury a less favorable impression of either attorney, which 
would be assumed if they lost sight of neutrality.191  Instead, both 
attorneys were viewed somewhat more favorably when jurors were 
allowed to ask questions.192 
Additionally, attorneys in the Heuer and Penrod national 
study did not expect questions to cause prejudice to their clients or 
to undermine the adversarial process goals.193  After the trial, the 
lawyers and judges were confident that those problems did not 
arise.194  This evidence suggests that critics’ concerns about the 
negative outcomes of allowing jurors to ask questions could be 
unfounded. 
Another concern with juror questioning is that jurors will 
attempt to uncover information intentionally left out by the 
attorney.195  In Heuer and Penrod’s Wisconsin study, lawyers were 
asked if the jurors raised information that they had deliberately left 
out, but the attorneys said that was not a problem.196  Therefore, 
juror questioning did not appear to interrupt the attorneys’ trial 
strategies.197 
Even though jurors do not know the rules of evidence, they 
still did not ask inappropriate questions.198  In the Wisconsin study, 
 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 146. 
 190. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 146. 
 191. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261. 
 192. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 146-47. 
 193. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 148. 
 194. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 148. 
 195. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 145; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119, at 255. 
 196. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260. 
 197. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119, at 255. 
 198. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 144-45. 
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judges and lawyers did not expect their questions to be 
inappropriate and they did not believe they were.199  The same 
responses occurred for the judges in the national study.200  Lawyers 
in the national study were originally more skeptical of the 
questions, but in the end they did not find the questions asked to 
be harmful or irrelevant.201  Furthermore, the Diamond et al. study 
found absolutely no instances within the 820 questions of jurors 
asking frivolous questions.202 
In addition, jurors do not give more weight to their own 
questions over the other evidence presented at trial.203  Jurors in the 
questioning condition were quite modest when evaluating the 
helpfulness of the answers to their questions.204  In addition, 
discussing answers to jurors’ questions was only 10% of deliberation 
time, an average of fifteen minutes.205 
Despite the critics’ beliefs, attorneys will object to 
inappropriate juror questions without reluctance, as shown in both 
Heuer and Penrod studies.206  In the national study, 20% of 
questions were objected to,207 and 17% were in the Wisconsin 
study.208  Lawyers in the national study objected to at least one 
 
 199. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260. 
 200. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 145. 
 201. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 145. 
 202. Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 17, at 27. 
 203. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 147. 
 204. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 147. 
 205. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 147-48. 
 206. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 145; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119, at 255-56. 
 207. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 145. 
 208. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra note 119, 
at 255-56. 
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question in 40% of the trials in which at least one question was 
asked.209  Jurors in both studies responded that they understood the 
basis for the objection and were not embarrassed or angry.210  
Similarly, Diamond et al. found that a majority (62%) of the 197 
questions disallowed by the judge resulted in no reaction from the 
jurors.211 
Furthermore, attorneys were concerned that juror questioning 
would unnecessarily slow down the trial, but lawyers in the 
question-asking trials responded that this was not a problem.212  
Judges did not believe that the practice would waste too much time, 
and judges in the question-asking trials did not find time to be an 
issue.213  Juror questioning also did not seem to affect courtroom 
decorum.214 
Heuer and Penrod concluded from their studies that there is 
not a prejudicial effect in allowing juror questioning.215  The judge-
jury agreement rate for the verdicts and the fact that the jurors had 
more favorable views of both attorneys when the practice was 
allowed show that the questions did not cause prejudice.216  Lawyers 
and judges did not see these biasing effects, even though lawyers 
had expected to see them.217  The judges and attorneys in the 
Wisconsin study did not seriously object to juror questioning, 
viewing it more favorably after participating in a trial with the 
procedure.218  Lawyers did not expect any major benefits and did 
not find any, but they also did not see any detriment.219  In the 
 
 209. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 145. 
 210. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 260; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 145-46; Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119, at 256. 
 211. See Diamond, Rose & Murphy, supra note 17, at 25. 
 212. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation: A Field Experiment, supra 
note 119, at 254-55. 
 213. Id. at 255. 
 214. Id. at 254-55. 
 215. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 148. 
 216. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261; 
Heuer & Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials, supra note 119, 
at 148. 
 217. Heuer & Penrod, Increasing Juror Participation, supra note 119, at 261. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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national study, judges and attorneys were asked to rate how much 
they agree with the statement, “I am in favor of allowing jurors to 
ask questions of witnesses during the trial.”220  Judges and lawyers in 
the juror-questioning condition were more enthusiastic with the 
practice.221  Judges in this condition were essentially undecided 
beforehand,222 and then moderately endorsed the procedure after 
exposure to it.223  Lawyers were modestly against the procedure224 
and then became more neutral afterwards.225 
In sum, some suggested benefits and criticisms of juror 
questioning are not supported by empirical research.  The practice 
does not aid jurors in finding the truth or help attorneys pinpoint 
areas that need further development.  Juror questioning did not 
threaten the adversary system, and instead jurors only asked 
questions to clarify testimony that would improve their neutral fact-
finding role.  The practice did not disturb attorney’s strategies or 
courtroom decorum.  Furthermore, jurors did not ask 
inappropriate or frivolous questions, nor did they give more weight 
to their questions than other evidence.  Attorneys were not 
reluctant to object to questions, and unanswered questions 
generally did not elicit any response.  Finally, juror questioning did 
not unnecessarily lengthen the trial process. 
VI.   THE CURRENT STATUS OF ALLOWING JURORS TO QUESTION 
WITNESSES 
The State of Arizona has been the leader of the reform 
effort,226 becoming the first to allow jurors to ask questions,227 and 
some states are now beginning to follow suit.228  Meanwhile, a few 
states have ruled the practice unconstitutional and forbid its use.229  
 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See generally Mize & Connelly, supra note 7, at 4-5; Janessa E. Shtabsky, 
Comment, A More Active Jury: Has Arizona Set the Standard for Reform with its New Jury 
Rules?, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1009 (1996). 
 227. Mize & Connelly, supra note 7, at 5. 
 228. Id.  For information on the first national meeting on jury reforms, see 
Robert Boatwright & Elissa Krauss, Jury Summit 2001: A Report on the First National 
Meeting of the Ever-Growing Community Concerned with Improving the Jury System, 86 
JUDICATURE 145 (2002). 
 229. These states are Minnesota, State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 
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Other states are reluctant to allow the practice but have ruled that 
it is constitutional.230  The federal circuits have all ruled that juror 
questioning is constitutional, but most discourage the practice.231 
A. Jurisdictions Allowing the Practice 
Approximately one-third of states have approved the use of 
juror questioning through either court rulings or state statutes.232  
The New Hampshire Supreme Court ordered that it is at the trial 
judge’s discretion to allow jurors to ask questions by approving 
Superior Court Rule 64-B.233  Vermont also ruled that the practice is 
permissible at the discretion of the trial judge.234  Although New 
York Judge Kenneth Lange has allowed juror questioning in his 
courtroom since 1984,235 it was not until 1994 that the state court 
determined that courts should allow juror questioning at the trial 
court’s discretion.236 
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the benefits of 
juror questioning in United States v. Callahan,237 stating, 
There is nothing improper about the practice of allowing 
occasional questions from jurors to be asked of witnesses.  
If a juror seems unclear as to a point in the proof, it 
makes good common sense to allow a question to be 
asked about it.  If nothing else, the question should alert 
trial counsel that a particular factual issue may need more 
extensive development.238 
The Tenth Circuit also ruled that the practice is permissible, 
 
2002); Mississippi, Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985 (Miss. 1998); Nebraska, State 
v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1991); and Texas, Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 
882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 
 230. See, e.g., Landt v. State, 87 P.3d 73 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 231. See infra notes 249-66 and accompanying text. 
 232. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JURY IMPROVEMENTS: JUROR QUESTIONS TO 
WITNESSES (2004), http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_improvements_juror_ 
questions.asp.  For a list of states’ rules on juror questioning, see AM. JUDICATURE 
SOC’Y, JURISDICTION-BY-JURISDICTION RULES FOR JUROR QUESTIONS TO WITNESSES 
(2004), http://www.ajs.org/jc/juries/jc_improvements_questions_laws.asp#n. 
 233. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, Order 1130 (Nov. 30, 2000), available 
at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/orders/ordr1130.htm. 
 234. State v. Doleszny, 844 A.2d 773 (Vt. 2004). 
 235. Jonathan Bandler, Practice Becoming More Popular in Courtrooms, THE 
JOURNAL NEWS (Westchester County, N.Y.), Feb. 3, 2002, at 1B. 
 236. People v. Bacic, 608 N.Y.S.2d 452, 452 (App. Div. 1994). 
 237. 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 238. Id. at 1086. 
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following precedent that no federal court has prohibited its use.239 
In addition, some states implemented pilot projects and 
produced reports recommending juror questioning.240  The results 
of the reports influenced Hawaii,241 New Jersey,242 Colorado,243 
Washington,244 and Tennessee245 to implement procedural rules for 
allowing the jury innovation.  In addition, the Massachusetts246 and 
Ohio247 courts have ruled in favor of the practice after their states’ 
pilot projects, although they used precedent for their reasoning248 
and do not mention the projects in their decisions. 
B. Jurisdictions Allowing the Practice, but Cautious of It 
A majority of the federal circuit courts have voiced their 
reservations about juror questioning, although they all permit the 
 
 239. Willner v. Soares, No. 02-1352, 2003 WL 254327, at *2 (10th Cir. Feb. 5, 
2003). 
 240. Mize & Connelly, supra note 7, at 5-7. 
 241. See HAW. R. PENAL P. 26; HAW. R. CIV. P. 47.  For more information on the 
project and its recommendations, see HAW. COMM. ON JURY INNOVATIONS FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY, HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT OF THE HAWAII COMMITTEE ON 
JURY INNOVATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1999); HAW. COMM. ON JURY INNOVATIONS 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, HAW. STATE JUDICIARY, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE HAWAII 
COMMITTEE ON JURY INNOVATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1999). 
 242. See N.J. CT. R. 1:8-8.  For information on the project and report, see JURY 
PILOT SUBCOMM., N.J. JUDICIARY, REPORT ON PILOT PROJECT ALLOWING JUROR 
QUESTIONS (2001), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/jurypilot/jurypilot.htm. 
 243. See COLO. R. CTY. CT. CIV. P. 347(u); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 24(g).  For the 
complete report and recommendations on jury reform in Colorado, see COLO. 
JURY REFORM IMPLEMENTATION COMM., COLO. JUDICIAL BRANCH, IMPLEMENTATION 
PLAN: JURY REFORM IN COLORADO (1998), http://www.courts.state.co.us/supct/ 
committees/juryreformdocs/98_jury_imp.pdf.  For information on the project 
and report see, DODGE, supra note 151; Leland P. Anderson & Melinda Taylor, Jury 
Reform in the State Court System, 33 COLO. LAW. 39 (2004). 
 244. See WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 43(k); WASH. CIV. R. CT. LIMITED JURIS. 43(k).  
For information on the project and report, see Jeffrey C. Grant, Recent Changes to 
Washington’s Jury Trials: A Great System Made Even Better, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 431 
(2003). 
 245. See TENN. R. CIV. P. 43A.03; TENN. R. CRIM. P. 24.1(c).  For information on 
the pilot project, see Neil P. Cohen, Better, Happier Juries: Tennessee Jury Reform 
Respects Jurors’ Time and Provides Them More Resources to Do the Job, 39 TENN. B.J. 16, 
17-18, 22 (2003). 
 246. Commonwealth v. Britto, 744 N.E.2d 1089, 1103-06 (Mass. 2001) 
(upholding the ruling allowing the practice and the procedures for its 
implementation); Commonwealth v. Urena, 632 N.E.2d 1200 (Mass. 1994).  For 
information on the project and report, see PAULA HANNAFORD & G. THOMAS 
MUNSTERMAN, MASSACHUSETTS PROJECT ON INNOVATIVE JURY TRIAL PRACTICES: FINAL 
REPORT (2002). 
 247. See generally State v. Fisher, 789 N.E.2d 222 (Ohio 2003). 
 248. Id. at 226-30; Britto, 744 N.E.2d at 1103-06. 
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practice.  In voicing their disapproval, the First Circuit said in 
United States v. Sutton, “juror participation . . . should be the long-
odds exception, not the rule.”249  In United States v. Ajmal250 and 
United States v. Bush,251 the Second Circuit ruled that the practice is 
at the discretion of the trial judge, but they “strongly discourage its 
use.”  Additionally, the Sixth Circuit,252 Seventh Circuit,253 and 
Eighth Circuit254 also discourage juror questioning.  Furthermore, 
the Third Circuit allows the practice after judicial screening of the 
questions, but stated, “the dangers of allowing jurors to ask 
questions orally far outweighs any perceived benefit of allowing 
juror questioning of witnesses.”255  The Fourth Circuit also permits 
juror questioning, but said the practice is “fraught with dangers 
which can undermine the orderly progress of the trial to verdict.”256 
The Ninth Circuit allows the procedure, but warns that juror 
questions “should not be encouraged or solicited.”257  This circuit 
ruled that the trial court has discretion in implementing the 
practice258 and that the trial judge makes no error in permitting the 
procedure.259  Since 1994, Ninth Circuit260 Judge Robert Jones has 
allowed jurors to interrupt witnesses on the stand and ask questions 
in civil trials.261  The lawyers have a switch under their desks that 
they can flip when they want to object to a question.262  A button 
then lights up under Jones’s bench and he can dismiss the 
question.263 
 
 249. United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 250. 67 F.3d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 251. 47 F.3d 511, 515 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 252. United States v. Collins, 226 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 253. United States v. Feinberg, 89 F.3d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 254. United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145, 147 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 255. United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 256. DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512, 516 (4th Cir. 
1985). 
 257. JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM. OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT, A MANUAL ON JURY TRIAL 
PROCEDURES 65 (2004), available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov/Web/ 
SDocuments.nsf/a67a78661317c5a58825673200662c8c/$FILE/2004%20manual 
.pdf. 
 258. United States v. Huebner, 48 F.3d 376, 382 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 259. United States v. Gonzales, 424 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 260. In the Portland, Oregon court. 
 261. Associated Press, Jurors Can Interrupt, Ask Questions, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 2, 
1999, at A7.  This article is summarized and monitored by Roger Knights for the 
Global Ideas Bank, available at http://www.globalideasbank.org/site/bank/idea 
.php?ideaId=420. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
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The Eleventh Circuit used precedent in ruling that juror 
questioning is permissible,264 but the court acknowledged the 
potential dangers discussed in past cases.265  Therefore, the court 
concluded that the practice is to be considered on a case-by-case 
basis.266 
In addition to federal courts, the Alaska Court of Appeals has 
ruled in Landt v. State267 that allowing jurors to ask questions at trial 
is not an abuse of judicial discretion.268  Alaska will review the 
permissibility on a case-by-case basis to determine if the procedure 
prejudices the defendant in the particular case.269 
C. Jurisdictions Forbidding the Practice 
While the federal courts have all permitted juror questioning 
(even though most caution its use), four states have ruled to 
completely forbid the practice.  Despite the Fifth Circuit’s opinion 
actually approving juror questioning, the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals270 ruled against the practice in Morrison v. State, stating, 
To allow our adversary system to travel, without prior 
authorization, unregulated by statute or rule, in the 
direction encouraged by the trial court’s practice is 
inconsistent with the principles underlying the system.  
Further, the dangers inherent in such a practice cannot 
be adequately circumvented by the imposition of 
procedural safeguards.271 
Along with Texas, the only other states that specifically 
prohibit jurors from asking questions to witnesses are Mississippi,272 
Nebraska,273 and Minnesota.274  The Mississippi Supreme Court 
 
 264. United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 265. Id. at 1290. 
 266. Id. at 1291. 
 267. 87 P.3d 73 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 268. Id. at 74. 
 269. Id. at 80. 
 270. Texas is within the Fifth Circuit’s federal jurisdiction. 
 271. Morrison v. Texas, 845 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).  
However, Texas does permit the practice in civil cases if the proper procedural 
safeguards are in place.  Hudson v. Markum, 948 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997).  
 272. Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985, 988-90 (Miss. 1998) (prohibiting the 
practice in both criminal and civil cases). 
 273. State v. Zima, 468 N.W.2d 377, 380 (Neb. 1991) (prohibiting the practice 
in both criminal and civil cases). 
 274. State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 2002) prohibits the practice in 
criminal cases.  There is currently no state case law about the permissibility of the 
practice in civil cases. 
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opined that a major problem with the practice is that jurors are 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence.275  The Nebraska Supreme 
Court ruled that juror questioning is prohibited because jurors 
become advocates and may possibly antagonize witnesses.276  
Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that allowing jurors 
to ask questions threatens the jurors’ role in the adversary system.277 
In sum, many states acknowledge the benefits of allowing 
jurors to ask questions and permit the practice at the discretion of 
the trial judge.  There are some states that are more cautious in 
allowing the procedure and the appellate courts will review the 
prejudicial effects of the practice on a case-by-case basis.  There are 
four states that prohibit juror questioning in criminal cases, and 
two that specifically disallow the practice in civil cases as well.  
Additionally, there are no federal circuit courts that forbid the 
practice, but a majority of them discourage its use. 
VII.    RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the psychological and other empirical evidence 
supporting jurors asking questions to witnesses, the authors 
conclude that this practice should be allowed during trial. 
The Story Model of juror decision-making indicates that jurors 
are cognitively active decision-makers.278  Legal experts such as 
Judge Dann have agreed that jurors are not passive decision-makers 
and have implemented juror innovations—such as allowing jurors 
to ask questions—that help jurors in their tasks.  Allowing jurors to 
ask questions provides answers that help jurors build accurate 
stories and come to better verdicts. 
Empirical psychological studies further support the idea that 
juror questioning can be beneficial279 and that the feared 
consequences do not seem to occur frequently.280  Jurors 
experience stress due to not being allowed to ask questions and feel 
they could have performed their jobs better if they were allowed to 
ask questions.  This is especially true when the legal issues or 
evidence is complex.  When allowed to ask, jurors appreciate the 
opportunity to ask questions and feel it helps them in their fact-
 
 275. Wharton, 734 So. 2d at 990. 
 276. Zima, 468 N.W.2d at 380. 
 277. Costello, 646 N.W.2d at 213. 
 278. See supra Part II. 
 279. See supra Part IV.A. 
 280. See supra Part V.B. 
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finder tasks.  Jurors are more confident in their verdicts and more 
satisfied with their jury experience when allowed to ask questions.  
In addition, court actors get a more favorable view of the 
procedure after experiencing it.  Other research has indicated that 
most jurors do not ask frivolous questions or make improper 
inferences when judges refuse to ask the question. 
On the other hand, some evidence indicates that actual 
comprehension is not enhanced, suggesting that the benefits of 
jury questioning are largely subjective.  Even if this is the case, it is 
still important that allowing jurors to ask questions improves jurors’ 
experiences in the court system.  Jury duty is an essential part of the 
justice system.  In order to encourage juror participation, courts 
should take measures to ensure participation and limit juror no-
shows.  This includes adopting procedures, such as juror 
questioning, which enhance the subjective experience of jury duty.  
Making jury duty a better experience encourages participation and 
preserves the integrity of the legal system. 
Because the wealth of psychological research reveals many 
benefits and few ills resulting from allowing jurors to ask questions, 
this article recommends that courts uniformly adopt the practice.  
It is recommended that jurisdictions follow the standards set forth 
by the ABA.  Courts should also develop training and education 
programs to inform judges about appropriate ways to conduct jury 
questioning. 
Finally, it is recommended that researchers continue to 
investigate the effects of questioning.  Many states have started 
their own task forces for implementing jury innovations, which is a 
step in the right direction.  Allowing jurors to ask questions 
benefits both the defendant and the jurors.  The practice helps 
jurors perform their role as fact-finders and allows them to make 
better judgments. 
While some states and judges have recognized the benefits and 
implemented juror questioning, many courts discourage or forbid 
the practice.  However, despite this division, there has become an 
emerging trend towards allowing questioning, as well as many other 
trial innovations.  Only four states refuse to permit juror 
questioning and no federal circuit court has prohibited the 
practice, thus it is possible that an increasing number of judges will 
realize the benefits and allow the reform in their courts.  With 
Arizona serving as an example, juror questioning may be a jury 
reform that blossoms even further in the near future. 
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